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a b s t r a c t 
Cryptography is one of the most widely employed means to ensure conﬁdentiality in the Internet of 
Things (IoT). Establishing cryptographically secure links between IoT devices requires the prior consensus 
to a secret encryption key. Yet, IoT devices are resource-constrained and cannot employ traditional key 
distribution schemes. As a result, there is a growing interest in generating secret random keys locally, 
using the shared randomness of the communicating channel. This article presents a secret key generation 
scheme, named SKYGlow, which is targeted at resource-constrained IoT platforms and tested on devices 
that employ IEEE 802.15.4 radios. We ﬁrst examine the practical upper bounds of the number of secret 
bits that can be extracted from a message exchange. We contrast these upper bounds with the current 
state-of-the-art, and elaborate on the workings of the proposed scheme. SKYGlow applies the Discrete 
Cosine Transform (DCT) on channel observations of exchanged messages to reduce mismatches and in- 
crease correlation between the generated secret bits. We validate the performance of SKYGlow in both 
indoor and outdoor scenarios, at 2.4 GHz and 868 MHz respectively. The results suggest that SKYGlow 
can create secret 128-bit keys of 0.9978 bits entropy with just 65 packet exchanges, outperforming the 
state-of-the-art in terms of energy eﬃciency. 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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1. Introduction 
As the Internet of Things (IoT) becomes part of our every day
ives, more physical objects are interconnected and remotely con-
rollable through the Internet. This paradigm introduces new secu-
ity risks, allowing malicious users to gain access to objects and in-
ormation that are traditionally considered secure [1] . In addition,
 large number of these objects are connected using wireless tech-
ology, which makes the communications vulnerable to eavesdrop-
ing. This highlights the need for conﬁdentiality, which is typically
ealised through encryption schemes. 
The challenge is that such wireless embedded devices are typi-
ally severely constrained in terms of computational power, mem-
ry, energy, and hardware space. Hence, traditional security ser-
ices, found in the upper layers of the OSI model, e.g. encryption
rotocols based on certiﬁcate management and key distribution
2] , are not applicable for resource-constrained IoT devices. As a
esult, there is research interest in creating resource-eﬃcient secu-∗ Corresponding author. 
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014 ity protocols that can supplement and support lightweight cryp-
ographic schemes [3–5] . 
An interesting alternative to key distribution is generating se-
ret bit sequences on the devices using channel observations.
hese bit sequences can be used directly as an encryption key or
s a seed to a number generator. This approach is based on the
heory of reciprocity for electromagnetic propagation, which sug-
ests that the channel between two transceivers is symmetrical
ithin the coherence time. Indeed, several works propose methods
hat enable two communicating parties to generate an encryption
ey, leveraging the channel impulse response during bidirectional
ransmissions [6,7] . The Mutual Information (MI) of the channel
bservations by the two transceivers deﬁnes the maximum key
eneration rate. 
Prior theoretical works studied the MI of in a variety of chan-
els and calculated its theoretical upper bound [8–10] . Other ex-
erimental works employ the Received Signal Strength (RSS) and
easure its entropy to estimate the size of the extracted bit se-
uence shared between the transceivers. In practice, however, the
xtracted bit sequences have errors, and these works rely on er-
or correction schemes, such as Forward Error Correction (FEC), to
itigate any inconsistencies. As a step forward, measuring the MInder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
ey generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
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a  of the RSS observations provides practical upper bounds and quan-
tiﬁes the need for error correction. 
In this article we ﬁrst measure the MI of channel observations
in several practical scenarios using IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers at
2.4 GHz and 868 MHz. Because of the nature of the transceivers,
we use the RSS of each received packet as a channel observation.
After calculating the practical upper bounds of the secret key gen-
eration rate, we present SKYGlow: a secret key generation protocol
that is designed for low-power IoT platforms. Different to the exist-
ing work, SKYGlow operates in the frequency domain. Indeed, the
proposed scheme employs a Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) stage,
and we use experimental data, collected using the aforementioned
transceivers, to verify its enhanced performance. In addition, we
quantify the probability that an eavesdropper can reconstruct the
secret key. In summary, the contributions of this work are: 
• In a series of practical scenarios, we measure the MI of the
common channel observations between two communicating
transceivers, assuming the existence of an eavesdropper. We
consider two cases: with knowledge and without knowledge
of the channel observations by the eavesdropper. The former is
used to quantify the maximum key generation rate, whilst the
latter is used to quantify the maximum key generation rate in
secrecy from the eavesdropper. 
• We present a new secret key generation scheme, named SKY-
Glow, whose performance is veriﬁed on experimental data. We
compare the performance of SKYGlow to similar schemes in the
literature, also designed for IoT applications, as well as against
the previously calculated practical upper bounds. 
• Extending our previous work [11,12] , this study considers two
different scenarios that cover a wide range of IoT deployments:
an indoor deployment operating at 2.4 GHz, and an outdoor de-
ployment operating at 868 MHz. In these scenarios we consider
both the cases of static and mobiles nodes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 covers the prior work, including effort s to assess
the limits of MI for each observation, as well as other secret key
generation schemes targeting the IoT domain. Section 3 presents
the results of our investigation on the practical upper bounds
of the secret key capacity. Section 4 elaborates on the proposed
scheme, SKYGlow. Section 5 evaluates SKYGlow, presents insights
regarding its advantages and disadvantages, and compares it
against other secret key generating schemes designed for the IoT.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the article. 
2. Prior work 
Prior work has investigated the idea of generating shared ran-
dom keys at two transceivers, using the shared randomness of the
common communicating medium. Some pioneering work in this
ﬁeld is done by Ahlswede and Csiszár [9,10] , who looked into the
generation of shared randomness by two communicating terminals
in secrecy from a third party. These works deﬁne the term ‘key
capacity’ as the maximum secret key generation rate by two ter-
minals that observe correlated sources, and prove that it is equal
to the MI, assuming a Discrete Memoryless Multiple Source Model
(DMMS). 
These early works were extended in [8] , which employs the MI
to quantify theoretical upper bounds for the shared randomness of
ultra-wideband channel observations. Other related works exam-
ine the generation of keys from observing various radio parameters
[7,13–15] . Yet, these works are not directly applicable to IoT devices
because they either have a purely information-theoretic perspec-
tive, or make use of specialized hardware for extracting the obser-
vations. Different to these works, this article studies the practicalPlease cite this article as: G. Margelis et al., Eﬃcient DCT-based secret k
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014 I between two communicating parties, using solely off-the-shelf
oT devices. 
Since the publication of [9] , several works present key genera-
ion algorithms with various results [13,16–19] . Assuming that Al-
ce and Bob wish to generate a secret shared key, these algorithms
enerally incorporate the following steps: 
1. Firstly, Alice and Bob communicate unencrypted messages to
each other. 
2. Alice and Bob collect observations that capture the effect of the
channel on each received message. In the case of SKYGlow, this
corresponds to the measurement of the exchanged messages’
RSS, as shown in Fig. 4 . 
3. The collected RSS values form a time-series that is quantized
and transformed into a binary series. 
4. In practice, each message exchange is not simultaneous as half-
duplex transceivers are used. The time delay between receiving
a message and transmitting a response is responsible for dis-
crepancies between Alice’s and Bob’s binary series. These errors
are reconciled, either using error correction [5,20] or some rec-
onciliation protocol, such as Cascade [17] . In [21] , the authors
opt for sacriﬁcing entropy to eliminate errors. 
5. Finally, after the two sequences become identical, they usually
have low entropy or, in the case of the Cascade protocol, signiﬁ-
cant information has leaked to the eavesdropper in the process.
Thus it is necessary to transform the sequences, in a way that
increases the entropy of the key and obfuscates any partial in-
formation may have leaked to an eavesdropper during key rec-
onciliation. This process, commonly referred to as privacy am-
pliﬁcation , leads to sequences with reduced size. 
SKYGlow works similarly, but operates in the frequency domain.
ndeed, SKYGlow introduces a DCT stage before quantization. The
oal of SKYGlow is to produce a secret bit with every RSS value, in
ontrast to previous works where a signiﬁcant portion of the ob-
ervations is unused. This yields to a reduction of the needed radio
sage (receptions and transmissions), and increases the energy ef-
ciency of key generation. When reliability is more important than
nergy eﬃciency, SKYGlow can be tuned to a higher key genera-
ion probability, by trading off the amount of secret bits generated
er packet exchanged. Finally, the proposed scheme results in keys
ith very high entropy, without the need of the privacy ampliﬁ-
ation stage. Thus, the energy consumption associated with this
rocessing stage is avoided, and the size of the sequence is not
educed. Both contribute to the eﬃciency of SKYGlow. 
. Practical limits of the key generation rate 
The MI, I ( X ; Y ), between X and Y is expressed as: 
(X ;Y ) = H(X ) − H(X | Y ) = H(Y ) − H(Y | X ) , (1)
here 
(X ) = −
∑ 
x ∈ X 
p(x ) log 2 p(x ) , (2)
(Y ) = −
∑ 
y ∈ Y 
p(y ) log 2 p(y ) , (3)
nd 
(X | Y ) = −∑ 
y ∈ Y 
∑ 
x ∈ X 
p(x, y ) log (p(y | x )) . (4)
he probabilities p ( x ) and p ( y ) are calculated empirically from the
easured frequencies of x and y . 
The MI corresponds the key capacity, deﬁned as the maximum
chievable key generation rate [9] . In this article the random vari-
bles are RSS measurements for each exchanged frame. Thus, X andey generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
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Fig. 1. The methodology of RSS logging. 
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Fig. 2. The topology of the indoor scenario. 
Fig. 3. The topology of the outdoor scenario. 
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p correspond to the RSS measurements of Alice (A) and Bob (B), re-
pectively. It is noted that, due to hardware constraints, the granu-
arity of the measurements is a single RSS value per frame. 
Because of the reciprocity of the channel, we expect X and Y to
e correlated, and the MI to be greater than zero, I ( X ; Y ) > 0. Fur-
hermore, (1) highlights the dependency of the MI on the entropy
f X and Y , indicating that high-entropy environments can eventu-
lly translate to higher key generation rates. 
.1. Secret key generation rate 
The existence of an eavesdropper, Eve (E), may have a negative
ffect on the key generation rate. Let us consider that Eve eaves-
rops all the exchanged messages. We denote as z x ∈ Z x and z y ∈ Z y 
he recorded RSS values for X and Y respectively. According to Wil-
on et al., [8] , the secret key generation rate is bounded by: 
(X ;Y || Z) = min [ I(X ;Y ) , I(X ;Y | Z x ) , 
I(X ;Y | Z y ) , I(X ;Y | Z x Z y )] . (5) 
e highlight that, in practice, the eavesdropper may miss some of
he exchanged messages due to packet loss. However, in this arti-
le, we assume that Eve can receive all of the packets, as we want
o focus on the worst case scenario. 
.2. Threat model 
In this section, we deﬁne Eve’s abilities. The ﬁrst assumption
s that the eavesdropper can listen to all communications between
lice and Bob, i.e. the legitimate communicating parties. We also
ssume that Eve is separated from Alice and Bob by more than the
oherence distance [22] . In addition, we assume that Eve does not
se her radio to inject traﬃc or jam the channel. We also assume
hat Eve eavesdrops the channel with a single-radio/single-antenna
ystem. In future work, we intend to loosen this assumption and
onsider the case of an omnipresent Eve [23] . We do not make
ny further assumption on her hardware capabilities. Before the
ommunication link between Alice and Bob is cryptographically se-
ured, we assume that Eve is able to capture the unencrypted syn-
rome, sent to Bob for reconciliation, and use it to reconstruct the
ecret key. After the ﬁrst key is established however, we assume
hat all subsequent syndromes are encrypted before transmission. 
.3. Implementation, measurements and experimental results 
We implemented our system in Contiki, the open source op-
rating system for IoT devices. For the indoor measurements we
se the CC2650 radio [24] that operates at 2.4 GHz. For the out-
oor measurements we use the CC1310 radio [25] at 868 MHz.
n both cases, three devices are used, acting as Alice, Bob, and
ve. These devices have half-duplex radios; hence, the captured
SS sequences correspond to messages transmitted with a small
ime delay. The message exchange sequence is shown in Fig. 1 ,Please cite this article as: G. Margelis et al., Eﬃcient DCT-based secret k
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014 here the transmission delay is denoted as t p ; t c is the time de-
ay between the reception of the packet and transmission of the
esponse; and t f is the time between two successive iterations
f the process. We highlight that t c must be as small as possi-
le, to ensure the reciprocity of the channel. In our implementa-
ion, t p = 2 . 4 ms, t c = 7 . 8 ms and t f = 1 s for the indoor case; and
 p = 12 ms, t c = 7 . 8 ms and t f = 0 . 2 s for the outdoor case. 
We performed a variety of experiments to measure the MI in
cenarios with different attributes. Fig. 2 shows the locations of
lice, Bob, and Eve in an indoor scenario (oﬃce space). In this set-
ing, we consider various scenarios with or without Line of Sight
LoS) between the devices in stationary positions. In addition, we
onsider the case of Alice being mobile, whilst Bob and Eve are in
heir stationary positions. It is noted that the channel is very dy-
amic, as Alice is moving inside and outside of the room. Thus, we
xpect mobility to create high variance in the RSS sequences. 
Fig. 3 depicts the outdoor location of Alice, Bob, and Eve. Simi-
arly, we positioned Alice and Bob in opposing sides of a busy road
ext to the University of Bristol. The constant traﬃc assures that
he channel is as dynamic as is typical to an urban environment.
ll of the devices are on street level, and occasionally LoS is es-
ablished. Eve is positioned 1.5 m away from Bob, with LoS, sta-
ionary and without any objects to disrupt the LoS. Thus, the RSS
rom Bob’s messages for Eve remains constant. In addition, we also
onsider the case of Alice being mobile, following the highlighted
ath. ey generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
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Table 1 
Summary of the measurements. X corresponds to Alice, Y corresponds to Bob, and Z x and Z y are the sequences of RSS 
observations by Eve respectively. The secret key generation rate is marked in bold. 
Scenario min( H ( X ), H ( Y )) I ( X ; Y ) I ( X ; Y | Z x ) I ( X ; Y | Z y ) I ( X ; Y | Z x , Z y ) 
Indoors: Alice, Bob and Eve with LoS 3.638 2.500 2.490 2.503 2.473 
Indoors: Alice, Bob with LoS, Eve without LoS 3.634 2.566 2.546 2.470 2.424 
Indoors: Alice, Bob and Eve without LoS 3.868 2.850 2.678 2.821 2.592 
Indoors: mobile scenario #1 4.541 3.128 3.079 3.063 2.918 
Indoors: mobile scenario #2 4.833 3.307 3.357 3.396 3.051 
Outdoors: stationary with occasional LoS 3.937 2.136 1.490 2.097 1.512 
Outdoors: mobile scenario #1 5.554 2.787 2.818 2.833 2.804 
Outdoors: mobile scenario #2 5.620 2.596 2.667 2.671 2.642 
Fig. 4. Overview of SKYGlow. 
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g  The results are summarized in Table 1 . The second column pro-
vides the minimum entropy of the sequences of RSS values logged
by Alice and Bob. Assuming that the two sequences had perfect
correlation, this would also be the mutual information of the two
sequences. Since correlation is not perfect, the mutual information
seen in the third column of the table, is actually a fraction of the
maximum possible; for indoor scenarios, I( X ; Y ) varies from 68 to
75% of the possible maximum, while for outdoor scenarios it varies
from 46 to 54% of the possible maximum, a result explained by the
even more reduced correlation of the measurements in the out-
door environment. Regardless, because of the Data Processing In-
equality, we cannot increase I( X ; Y ) further than the values of the
third column, which are our practical upper boundaries and can be
used to assess the performance of any method to derive secret bits
from similar application scenarios. 
Furthermore, we note that the maximum key capacity is al-
ways higher than 2.1 bits, while the secret key capacity is generally
higher than 2.4 bits, and never less than 1.5 bits. Secret key gener-
ation schemes for IoT devices in the existing literature generate at
best 1 secret bit per exchange, as we can see in Section 5 . Hence,
there is still considerable space for improvement. 
4. SKYGlow 
This section presents SKYGlow, providing further details on
each of its stages. As highlighted before, SKYGlow generates keys
of high entropy without requiring a privacy ampliﬁcation stage. In
this article, we present two versions of the proposed algorithm;
SKYGlow.a for applications that prioritize energy eﬃciency, and
SKYGlow.c for applications that prioritize reliability. The algorithms
share the same principles, with the only variations being found
in the DCT phase, which is our most important contribution. An
overview of SKYGlow is shown in Fig. 4 . Please cite this article as: G. Margelis et al., Eﬃcient DCT-based secret k
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014 .1. Sampling and DCT 
The ﬁrst stage of SKYGlow is RSS sampling. The protocol targets
ingle-radio low-power IoT devices. Such devices typically provide
he RSS indicator, which indirectly captures the channel attenua-
ion. Most commercial radios do not provide detailed information
n how the given RSS indicator is calculated. Yet, we assume that
he process is identical in both devices. 
SKYGlow applies a DCT to the series of RSS values, before feed-
ng them to the quantizer. The DCT converts a ﬁnite time-series
f samples ( i.e. the RSS values) into a sum of cosine functions at
ifferent frequencies: 
 k = 
N−1 ∑ 
n =0 
x n cos 
[ 
π
N 
(
n + 1 
2 
)
k 
] 
k = 0 , . . . , N (6)
s shown in the next section, SKYGlow outperforms other related
ey generation schemes in energy-eﬃciency. This advantage orig-
nates from the introduction of the DCT stage, which curates the
nput signal, enabling higher eﬃciency at the quantization stage.
ﬃcient adaptability and resilience to bit injections are additional
dvantages, as brieﬂy discussed in the remainder of this section.
ig. 5 illustrates the DCT. 
The DCT stage makes the proposed scheme able to dynamically
iscard high frequency components that are largely responsible
or bit errors. Thus, SKYGlow is tunable, and able to increase the
ate when the channel is more symmetrical, and decrease the rate
hen there is a lower degree of reciprocity (for example, when the
oherence time is lower than the sampling period). 
We take advantage of this feature to tailor the performance of
KYGlow to the application scenario, introducing two versions of
he algorithm, namely SKYGlow.a and SKYGlow.c. SKYGlow.a ap-
lies the DCT detailed in (6) with N equal to the number of RSS
alues collected and then passes those N cosine wave components
o the quantizer detailed in the next section. SKYGlow.c discards
he higher N /2 cosine wave components, and passes to the quan-
izer only the lower frequency components. These lower frequency
omponents have increased correlation compared to the ones with
igher frequencies. We note however that, as we will see later, this
ncrease leads to a reduction in the amount of bits generated per
essage exchange. An illustration of the difference between SKY-
low.a and SKYGlow.c can be seen in Fig. 6 . 
We note that although the results of SKYGlow.c are similar to
assing the RSS vector through a low pass ﬁlter before passing
he values to the quantizer, our scheme generates all cosine am-
litudes in advance, and can then ﬁne-tune the number of com-
onents needed, without having to go through the process again.
n contrast, with a low pass ﬁlter the process would have to be
tarted again from the beginning, costing time and energy. Fur-
hermore, our scheme allows an overlaying adaptation layer to dy-
amically discard different number of DCT components under spe-
iﬁc conditions. For example, Alice and Bob may choose to drop
 certain amount of high frequency components after n failed key
eneration attempts. Moreover, as we will see later, were SKYGlowey generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
G. Margelis et al. / Ad Hoc Networks 0 0 0 (2018) 1–11 5 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: ADHOC [m5G; September 11, 2018;23:50 ] 
Fig. 5. An example of a series of 64 RSS measurements (top). The output of the Discrete Cosine Transformation (middle). The generated 128-bit secret key (bottom). 
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d  o be implemented in a wearable device, it could employ SKY-
low.a in an indoor environment but SKYGlow.c when moving out-
oors, where the channel is much more dynamic and correlation
egrades. The transition could take place seamlessly without any
eed for additional hardware. 
There is also a security advantage that stems from the DCT
tage. One important vulnerability of schemes similar to the one
escribed in [13] is that they are vulnerable to attacks that can
ead to bits injected by a malicious actor following the same
ethod as the one suggested in [26] . To summarize this method,
ve measures the RSS of both the eavesdropped messages trans-
itted from Alice and Bob, and measures the difference between
hem. When the difference is minimal or even non-existent, that
eans that the channel between Eve and Alice and the channel
etween Eve and Bob are very highly correlated, and thus a multi-
ast message transmitted inside the coherent time of the channels
ould be received from both Alice and Bob with the same RSS,
ecause of the reciprocity of the channels. By adjusting the trans-
itting power of those messages and spooﬁng the identity of the
ender, Eve could potentially inject bits in the bitstream that Al-
ce and Bob generate, that are highly correlated and thus persist
hrough the information reconciliation stage. For a more elaborate
escription of the method, we refer the reader to [26] . 
Schemes like the ones described in [13,16] are vulnerable to
uch an attack. However, the DCT stage makes this attack less prac-
ical. Consider, that due to slow and fast fading, it is not possible
n most practical environments for Eve to predict when the chan-
els between Eve & Alice and Eve & Bob will be highly correlated,
hus Eve cannot predict when she can inject bits. More importantly
hough, the injected bits are not directly fed to the quantization
tage to be converted to 0s or 1s. Instead the DCT stage creates
s  
Please cite this article as: G. Margelis et al., Eﬃcient DCT-based secret k
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014  set of coeﬃcients from a set of bits. Even if a number of them
re injected, because Eve has no knowledge of the remaining she
ould not be able to predict how those injected packets affected
he overall time series, and thus it would be more challenging to
redict the effect on the coeﬃcients. Alice and Bob, on the other
and, proceed as usual. 
.2. Quantization 
In the next stage, SKYGlow quantizes x n and uses the quantized
utput to generate a secret bit sequence. Most related works use
 quantizer with a censoring region ( e.g. [21] ). Such quantizers op-
rate as follows. A censoring region, [ μ + ασ, μ − ασ ] , is deﬁned
y a parameter α > 0, where μ is the mean and σ is the stan-
ard deviation of the input series, and all values that are in this
egion are discarded. The samples x n > μ + ασ are then quantized
s 1 and the samples x n < μ − ασ are quantized as 0. This ap-
roach ﬁlters the samples that have a low degree of correlation,
ue to e.g. thermal noise, out of the key generation process. Em-
loying a censoring region has two drawbacks. Firstly, if a message
xchange is very close to the border of the censoring region, there
s a probability that only one of the two communicating parties
ill include it. This results to desynchronized sequences and, thus,
urther errors. Secondly, the discarded measurements are a source
f wasted energy. Indeed, the larger the censoring region, the more
ackets are exchanged without contributing to the generated key.
n an energy-conscious IoT context, such ineﬃciencies are undesir-
ble. 
The quantizer of SKYGlow calculates the mean, μ, and the stan-
ard deviation, σ , of the cosine components, provided by the DCT
tage. The quantizer does not have a censoring region, instead itey generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
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Fig. 6. The inverse transform of the output of the DCT stage of SKYGlow. 
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Eoperates as follows, generating two bits per cosine component: 
Q(n ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
11 , x n ≥ μ + σ, 
10 , μ ≤ x n < μ + σ, 
01 , μ − σ < x n < μ, 
00 , x n ≤ μ − σ. 
4.3. Error correction 
The channel is not perfectly symmetrical, due to the time delay
between messages and the effect of thermal noise. These leads to
potential inconsistencies between the RSS series of Alice and Bob.
These inconsistencies can, in turn, lead to differences in the co-
sine waves, and, if close to the quantization thresholds, to bit mis-
matches. 
In [21] , the authors sacriﬁce entropy to reduce the mismatches
with ﬁltering. Other works employ Cascade [27] . Yet, Cascade is
unsuitable for energy-constrained IoT devices, at it requires a large
number of message exchanges to operate [28] . 
As mentioned in Section 4.1 , SKYGlow is tunable and able to
eﬃciently discard the high frequency cosine waves, in accordance
with the characteristics of the environment. Any bit mismatches at
the quantization stage are addressed with the Information Recon-
ciliation stage, as shown in Fig. 4 . This stage is implemented using
Slepian-Wolf Low Density Parity Codes (LDPC) with a code rate of
7. This conﬁguration ensures that the syndrome can be transmitted
with a single 802.15.4 packet. Hence, SKYGlow only needs to send
one additional packet to support error correction. 
5. Evaluation 
SKYGlow.a and SKYGlow.c are evaluated using the measure-
ments described in Section 3.3 . SKYGlow.a generates a single 128-
bit key with every set of 64 observations ( i.e. 65 packets including
the syndrome). Similarly, SKYGlow.c operates on sets of 128 ob-
servations. As a result, SKYGlow.a can generate up to 1.96 secret
bits per packet and SKYGlow.a can generate up to 0.99 secret bits
per packet. In practice however, due to mismatches that our cod-
ing cannot correct, the long term average secret bits per packet are
expected to be lower than the maximum values. Please cite this article as: G. Margelis et al., Eﬃcient DCT-based secret k
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014 .1. Evaluation metrics 
The performance of SKYGlow is assessed with the following list
f metrics: 
• Bit Error Rate (BER): BER denotes the bit mismatch probability
between two generated keys. 
• Key Agreement Rate (KAR): KAR denotes the probability of gen-
erating identical keys with no bit errors. 
• Key Leakage Rate (KLR): KLR denotes the probability of Eve re-
constructing the key using the unencrypted syndrome. 
• Key Entropy: The generated key should be random, thus, with
an entropy that is ideally 1. 
• Secret Bits per Packet (SBP): SBP denotes the number of gen-
erated bits per message exchange between the communicating
parties. SBP is a proxy for energy-eﬃciency. 
• Energy per 128-bit Key (EK-128): EK-128 denotes the energy
required to generate a 128-bit key. Smaller values indicate a
more energy-eﬃcient system that is more suitable for energy-
constrained IoT devices. 
If the BER is high, LDPC decoding may fail to correct the mis-
atches. Let us denote the bit success probability as p, i.e. KAR is
qual to 1 − p, and the number of packets needed for the gener-
tion of one key as N . On average, E [ N ] packets are required for
enerating a single key, as given by: 
[ N] = 
∞ ∑ 
n =1 
Np n −1 (1 − p) n = N 
1 − p , 
here N = 65 or N = 129 for SKYGlow.a and SKYGlow.c respec-
ively. E [ N ] is also employed as a performance metric that, similarly
o SBP, acts as a proxy for energy-eﬃciency. 
To maximize security, it would be natural to execute SKYGlow
eriodically and generate fresh keys. As a result of the fact that the
ery ﬁrst syndrome is unencrypted, the ﬁrst key would be more
ulnerable than the following ones. Assuming that q is equal to
he KLR, we calculate the expected number of leaked packets as: 
[ M] = 
∞ ∑ 
m =1 
q m · E[ N] = q 
1 − q 
N 
1 − p 
ey generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
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Table 2 
Performance metrics for indoor scenarios at 2.4 GHz. 
SKYGlow.a SKYGlow.c 
Stationary Mobile Stationary Mobile 
LoS nLoS LoS nLoS 
BER (A) 0.032 0.007 0.035 0.001 0.001 0.003 
BER (E) 0.483 0.483 0.485 0.476 0.482 0.480 
KAR 0.835 0.897 0.844 0.902 0.911 0.938 
KLR 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.008 
SBP 1.64 1.77 1.90 0.89 0.90 0.93 
Entropy 0.997 0.998 0.997 0.998 0.998 0.998 
E[N] 77.66 72.34 67.36 142.90 141.50 137.46 
E[M] 0.52 0.73 0.28 1.29 1.41 1.10 
EK-128 36.3 33.8 39.5 66.8 66.1 64.3 
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Fig. 7. Scatter plots illustrating the correlation of measurements for both the sta- 
tionary with LoS, and mobile indoor scenarios. 
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w   [ M ] is employed as a metric that evaluates security. 
EK-128 can also be approximated in a similar manner. Assum-
ng that Q tx and Q rx is the electric charge required to transmit and
eceive a packet respectively, and that Q p is the electric charge re-
uired for executing SKYGlow, EK-128 is given by 
K-128 = 
∞ ∑ 
n =1 
p n −1 (1 − p) V 
(
N(Q tx + Q rx ) + Q p 
)
n , 
here V is the system voltage. Due to the signiﬁcant improvements
n energy-eﬃciency of modern microcontrollers [29] , the fact that
CT can be hardware-accelerated [30] , and the fact that communi-
ation occurs two orders of magnitude more frequently than pro-
essing ( i.e. by factor of N ), for the remainder of the section we
onsider that radio dominates the energy required to generate a
ey. In addition, we assume the use of the TSCH (Time-Slotted,
hannel Hopping) protocol (a recent addition to the IEEE 802.15.4
tandard) and adopt the electric charge measurements provided
n [31] for the GINA platform [32] ( Q tx = 69 . 6 μC, Q rx = 72 . 1 μC,
 = 3 . 3 V). We consider ﬁve times higher consumption for sub-
Hz IEEE 802.15.4 to account for the lower transmission rate. All
eported EK-128 values are in mJ. It is highlighted that the energy
equired to generate a key is platform-dependent, and thus the re-
orted EK-128 values are indicative. The SBP metric, on the other
and, is more suitable for platform-agnostic comparisons. 
Lastly, we conﬁrm the randomness of the generated keys with
he NIST statistical test suite [33] . 
.2. Indoor applications at 2.4 GHz 
In this section, SKYGlow is evaluated in an indoor environment,
s illustrated in Fig. 2 . This is a common environment for indoor
onitoring applications. A summary of the results of the indoor
xperiments can be seen in Table 2 . 
Alice, Bob and Eve remain stationary: During oﬃce hours (09:00–
7:00), the environment is busy. Human activity makes the chan-
el dynamic and, thus, increases the entropy of the measurements
11] . Fig. 7 shows that there is strong correlation between the RSS
ogged by Bob and Alice, whilst there is signiﬁcantly worse corre-
ation between the RSS logged by Bob and Eve. 
We examine two types of links, with and without LoS. In the
ase of SKYGlow.a with LoS the key agreement rate is 0.835, whilst
7.66 messages are required on average to generate a key of 128
its. This translates to an SBP of 1.64 and an EK-128 of 36.3 mJ on
verage. SKYGlow.c yields higher key agreement probability (0.902)
t the cost of eﬃciency (0.89 secret bits per packet). Indeed an av-
rage of 142.9 packets are required to generate a key and the EK-
28 is 66.8 mJ on average. In the non Line of Sight (nLoS) case,
KYGlow performs better, because of the fact that the channel is
ore dynamic, as it relies on multipath components. More specif-
cally, SKYGlow.a yields a higher KAR (0.897) and requires 72.34Please cite this article as: G. Margelis et al., Eﬃcient DCT-based secret k
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014 essages to generate a key is 72.34. In turn, SBP is 1.77 and EK-
28 is 33.8 mJ on average. 
Alice is mobile, Bob and Eve remain stationary: Next, we examine
he scenario of a link between a stationary and a mobile terminal,
.g. off-body communications. This scenario was executed twice,
ielding similar results. As expected, mobility results to the highest
erformance due to the channel dynamics. SKYGlow.a yields a key
eneration probability of 0.844, requiring 67.36 packets on average
o generate a 128-bit key. The rate is 1.90 bits per packet and the
K-128 is 39.5 mJ on average. When employing SKYGlow.c the KAR
ises to 0.938, needing 137.46 messages on average to generate the
ey, meaning that the SBP drops to 0.93. The reader can refer to
ig. 7 , where the correlation of the RSS for the legitimate and the
iretap channel is illustrated. 
.3. Outdoor applications at 868 MHz 
Although indoor scenarios are a large part of IoT applications,
t is equally important to examine how any secret key genera-
ion scheme works in an outdoor setting. The 868 MHz band has
een used extensively for these type of applications thanks to the
arge transmission range (some communication protocols like Sig-
ox’s claim up to 40 km where LoS is available [34] ). Furthermore,
he energy-conscious design of SKYGlow complements well the
nergy-saving features of Low Throughput Networks as deﬁned by
TSI’s speciﬁcations. We proceed then to evaluate SKYGlow’s per-
ormance on the 868 MHz band in a variety of topologies. A sum-
ary of the results of the outdoor experiments can seen in Table 3 .
Alice, Bob and Eve remain stationary: Our ﬁrst examined outdoor
cenario assumes that both Alice and Bob, as well as Eve remain
tationary. Alice and Bob are positioned in opposing sides of a busy
oad with constant traﬃc and pedestrians. In such a situation, as
e can see in Fig. 8 , there is signiﬁcant correlation when there
eems to be LoS, which degrades as the power of the received mes-
ages get weaker. Lack of correlation can limit the performance of
KYGlow.a, in which case it is advisable to switch to SKYGlow.c.
imilarly to the indoor experiments, the correlation between Bob
nd Alice is very strong (0.9726), yet signiﬁcantly weaker between
ve and Bob (0.7353). 
Alice is mobile, Bob and Eve remain stationary: Next, we exam-
ne the scenario where one of the transceivers is mobile, while
he other remains stationary. We can see in Fig. 3 the path that
he mobile terminal followed. We present two different cases for
he mobile scenario, the ﬁrst having Alice moving at a slow pace,
hile in the second Alice was moving at a fast pace. As we caney generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
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Table 3 
Performance metrics for outdoor scenarios at 868 MHz. 
SKYGlow.a SKYGlow.c 
Mobile 1 Mobile 2 Stationary Mobile 1 Mobile 2 Stationary 
BER (A) 0.078 0.109 0.004 0.028 0.015 0.001 
BER (E) 0.488 0.491 0.495 0.492 0.485 0.497 
KAR 0.750 0.687 0.892 0.866 0.886 0.909 
KLR 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
SBP 1.48 1.36 1.76 0.86 0.88 0.894 
Entropy 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.997 
E[N] 86.33 94.15 72.74 148.80 145.46 143.22 
E[M] 0.173 0.283 0.073 0.149 0.438 0.143 
EK-128 201.8 220.1 170.1 347.9 340.1 334.9 
Fig. 8. Scatterplots illustrating the correlation of measurements for both the sta- 
tionary and mobile outdoor scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
The results of testing 10,0 0 0 SKYGlow keys with the NIST test suite [33] . 
The pass rate is approximately 9870/10 0 0 0. 
Statistical test Success proportion 
“Frequency (Monobits) Test” 9972/10,0 0 0 
“Frequency Test Within a Block” 9972/10,0 0 0 
“Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test (early stages)” 9976/10,0 0 0 
“Cumulative Sums (Cusum) Test (late stages)” 9975/10,0 0 0 
“Approximate Entropy Test” 10,0 0 0/10,0 0 0 
“Serial Test #1” 9972/10,0 0 0 
“Serial Test #2” 9972/10,0 0 0 
Table 5 
Performance comparison at 2.4 GHz. 
SBP EK-128 Entropy 
Ali et al. [21] 0.33–0.37 161.8–181.4 0.9979 
Patwari et al. [18] 0.05–0.44 136–1197.1 0.9590 
Li et al. [41] 0.65–0.75 79.8–92.1 0.993 
SKYGlow.a 1.36–1.9 33.8–39.5 0.9971 
SKYGlow.c 0.86–0.93 64.3–66.8 0.9979 
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s  observe in Fig. 8 , there is now a greater variation of RSS values
in the legitimate channel, although correlation reduces as the RSS
weakens in similar fashion with the stationary scenario. Again, the
correlation between Bob and Alice is very strong (0.9728), whilst
the correlation of the RSS measurements logged by Eve and Bob is
signiﬁcantly weaker (0.8110). 
5.4. NIST statistical tests 
A vital requirement for a key generation algorithm is to gen-
erate keys that are random . We evaluate the randomness of the
keys that we generate with SKYGlow using the NIST statistical test
suite [33] : a suite that is regularly used to measure the outputs of
random or pseudo-random number generators that may he used
in many cryptographic applications, such as the generation of key
material. 
SKYGlow successfully passed the “Frequency (Monobits) Test”
and the “Frequency Test Within a Block”, both versions of the “Cu-
mulative Sums Test”, the “Approximate Entropy Test” and both ver-
sions of the “Serial Test”. Maurer’s “Universal Test”, the “Discrete
Fourier Transform, Random Excursions Test”, and its variant, “Binary
Matrix Rank, Linear Complexity Test” were not examined as they are
designed to test sequences signiﬁcantly larger than the ones gen-
erated by SKYGlow. The results of testing 10,0 0 0 keys generated by
SKYGlow can be seen in Table 4 . 
5.5. Discussion on experimental results 
First of all, the results suggest that SKYGlow is characterized
by a very high key agreement probability. Indeed, it is practically
guaranteed that a key will be generated after exchanging 195 mes-Please cite this article as: G. Margelis et al., Eﬃcient DCT-based secret k
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014 ages, as the probability of three consecutive failed attempts is less
han 1%. 
Secondly, the results suggest that the entropy and correlation of
he RSS observations control the performance of SKYGlow. When
he environment is very static and the entropy of the observations
s very low, the RSS measurements are characterized by uncorre-
ated randomness (due to, e.g. thermal noise) that makes the per-
ormance drop. Fig. 9 shows the effects of the entropy and corre-
ation of the RSS observations on the performance of SKYGlow.a.
he ﬁgure suggests that more than 1.2 bits of entropy and more
han 0.7 correlation are needed for agreeing a key in less than 200
acket transmissions. 
Our measurements in real-world environments suggest that hu-
an activity makes the environment suﬃciently dynamic to satisfy
hese requirements. Indeed, the indoor measurements suggest that
uring oﬃce hours, the correlation is generally greater than 0.8,
hilst the entropy is greater than 1.5, in both stationary and mo-
ile links, as shown in Fig. 10 . Yet, these requirements are not sat-
sﬁed during non-working hours (0 0:0 0-06:0 0) where there is no
uman activity in the environment. In such cases, generating secret
eys with SKYGlow, or any other secret key generation scheme for
hat matter, becomes ineﬃcient. A possible solution to this could
e to create keys during high-entropy periods that are then stored
nd used in low-entropy periods. However, storing keys locally for
uture use, opens up a new host of potential vulnerabilities. Fur-
her exploration of this issue is considered out of the scope of this
rticle. 
.6. Comparison with other schemes 
Table 5 compares the performance of SKYGlow against three
chemes in the literature that are also suitable for resource-ey generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
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Fig. 9. The effect of entropy (top) and correlation (bottom) on the key agreement rate (blue) and E[N] (red). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure 
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
Fig. 10. Empirical CDF of the correlation (top) and the entropy (bottom) for mobile 
links, and stationary links during working hours and non-working hours. 
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t  onstrained IoT platforms. Interested in energy eﬃciency rather
han speed, we do not compare the key generation schemes in
erms of bits per second (bps), as typically seen in the litera-
ure. Instead, we use the SBP and EK-128 metrics. As a result,
e omit [35] from the comparison, as it is not possible to de-
ive these metrics from the published paper. We note however that
KYGlow outperforms [35] by one order of magnitude (1.64 bps
gainst 0.195 bps). Furthermore, we limit the scope of the compar-
son to battery-powered IoT platforms with a single antenna thatPlease cite this article as: G. Margelis et al., Eﬃcient DCT-based secret k
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.08.014 re based on low-power wireless standards, such as IEEE 802.15.4.
chemes like [36–39] are unsuitable for such IoT platforms as they
mploy multiple antennas or frequency diversity. We also limit our
cope to schemes that support point-to-point links. Therefore, we
mit [40] as it assumes topologies with pre-authenticated relays. 
It is also highlighted that an important difference between SKY-
low and [41] (included in the comparison) is that the latter as-
umes full duplex communication, and is evaluated on devices that
ave the ability to transmit and receive concurrently in different
requency channels (frequency-division duplex). SKYGlow, on the
ther hand, does not require full duplex and is, therefore, applica-
le to platforms that do not support this functionality. 
Overall, Table 5 demonstrates that, similarly to the related
orks, the keys that are generated by SKYGlow have suﬃciently
igh entropy. The important difference lies on the fact that key
eneration is more energy-eﬃcient, i.e. Alice and Bob need to ex-
hange fewer messages in order to establish a shared key. 
Although SKYGlow.a outperforms other proposed schemes in
he literature, there is still signiﬁcant space for improvement as at
ts best it can only generate 1.9 bits per message exchange, while
he predicted maximum for the same scenario, based on the MI, is
pproximately 3 bits per message exchange. 
. Conclusions 
This article ﬁrst identiﬁes the practical upper bounds of the key
apacity between two off-the-shelf IEEE 802.15.4-based IoT devices,
n real-world experiments that consider a variety of practical set-
ings, such as indoor links, outdoor links, and mobile links. The ar-
icle then presents SKYGlow: an energy-eﬃcient secret key gener-
tion algorithm, suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices. The
roposed scheme introduces a DCT stage between the sampling
nd quantization stage, resulting in bit sequences that are charac-
erized high entropy, thus making the privacy ampliﬁcation stageey generation for the Internet of Things, Ad Hoc Networks (2018), 
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 unnecessary. Moreover, by operating on the frequency domain, the
process is tunable, allowing the protocol to eﬃciently discard un-
correlated high-frequency components. SKYGlow is able to gener-
ate secret keys of high entropy with few packet exchanges ( i.e. , up
to 1.9 and 1.64 bits per packet in mobile and stationary scenarios
respectively), and thus constitutes an eﬃcient solution for encryp-
tion key generation by energy-constrained IoT devices. 
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